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Abstract 
Even though the study of disability rights advocacy has led to major contributions to social 
movement sociography and theory, the role played by the disability rights movement in the 
politics of implementation of disability policy within street-level bureaucracies remains 
largely unstudied. Based on a study of the disability sector in France, this paper explores this 
less-documented aspect of disability advocacy, focusing more specifically on the role played 
by association representatives in the allocation of disability rights. Indeed, following a major 
2005 reform of disability policy, these representatives were granted a third of the seats in the 
local committees in charge of the allocation of disability rights on an individual basis. Mainly 
drawing on interviews with volunteers and professionals sitting on these local committees, as 
well as observations of committee meetings, this paper analyzes how movement members 
define their role in this institutional context. It first analyzes the role played by disability 
rights organizations in counseling disabled people and their families before they submit their 
applications to the local bureaucracy in charge of allocating disability rights (Maisons 
départementales des personnes handicapées, MDPH). The study of pre-application 
counseling practices reveals a clear partition between volunteers and professionals, as well as 
intra-movement differences regarding voluntary involvement in counseling. Being on the 
allocation committees, association members’ interiorization of institutional constraints does 
not result in their assuming a purely institutional role, but favors a reframing of advocacy, in 
terms of oversight rather than participation in decision-making.  
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Introduction: advocacy through allocation?  
The study of disability rights advocacy has led to significant contributions to social movement 
sociography and theory, be it through analyses regarding the conditions under which disability 
consciousness may arise (Groch 1994; Scotch 1988; Vanhala 2011), the impulse given by the 
disability rights movement in legal and policy change as well as in the more general 
transformation of common representations of disability (notably from a “biomedical” to a 
“social” vision) (Carey 2009; Erkulwater 2006; Fleischer and Zames 1998, 2011; Scotch 
1984; Stone 1984; Switzer 2003), the uses of strategic litigation by the disability rights 
movement (Kelemen and Vanhala 2010; Mezey 1988; Vanhala 2011), or the role of social 
movements in “legal transplants” and the way the civil rights frame was imported from one 
country to the other by disability rights activists (Heyer 2002). Based on a study of the 
disability rights movement at the local level in France
2
,  the aim of this paper is to shed light 
on a less studied aspect of disability rights advocacy, under the form of movement members’ 
participation in the allocation of disability rights in street-level bureaucracies.  
Much less studied than advocacy at the stage of agenda-setting and policy definition, social 
movements’ role in the “politics of implementation” of disability policy (Percy 1989) so far 
has been studied from two different perspectives: the use of strategic litigation as a way to 
favor rights enforcement (Vanhala 2011), and the contracting of movement organizations by 
public authorities as service providers, in a logic of delegation of public service (Barral 2007; 
Heng-hao and Ming-sho 2008; Smith and Lipsky 1993a). While strategic litigation now is 
apprehended as a social movement strategy in its own right (McCann 1994, 2006), studies 
that focus on service-providing and the integration of SMOs as policy tools within the 
implementation process tend to stress the negative effect of this form of movement action on 
movement activism (Skocpol 2003). The effects of this form of movement institutionalization 
are analyzed in terms of de-radicalization or corporatism (Smith and Lipsky 1993b; Wilson 
1988), contracting and serving as service-provider being described as favoring a weakening of 
activism (Heng-hao and Ming-sho 2008) as well as a reduced autonomy of organizations in 
defining the format of service provision in their own terms (Priestley 1999).  
The equation of movement institutionalization with de-radicalization or the end of advocacy 
however has been questioned by other writings in social movement theory, notably based on 
studies of women’s movement activism (Banaszak 2010; Bereni and Revillard 2012; 
Katzenstein 1998). Advocacy, these authors argue, may redeploy itself within institutional 
settings, with sometimes more significant effects than street protest (Katzenstein 1998). This 
does not mean that institutionalization always preserves advocacy, but simply that no 
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systematic assumption can be made regarding its effects, which need to be analyzed 
empirically.  
This is what I offer to do here, focusing on the role of disability organizations in the 
implementation of disability policy at the local level in France. The more specific aspect I 
choose to focus on in this paper is the participation of these organizations in the allocation of 
disability rights. Indeed, following a major reform of disability law and policy in France in 
2005
3, “association4” representatives were granted a third of the seats in the local committees 
in charge of the allocation of disability rights on an individual basis, according to a 
participatory system of rights allocation that has become common in French social policy, 
described in social policy literature as “social magistratures” (Astier 2000; Bertrand, Caradec, 
and Eideliman 2011; Bureau and Rist 2013; Weller 2000). This takes place in the context of 
an increasing individualization of social policy, where disability rights are to be allocated on 
an individual basis, notably based on the applicant’s “life project” and on a multi-disciplinary 
expertise that, beyond the medical aspects, is to take into account the concrete effects of 
disability on daily life according to each person’s life situation (Astier and Duvoux 2006). 
This reflects a French model of disability which, since 2005, mingles aspects of the 
biomedical and the social vision of disability
5
. Such a context increases the autonomy of the 
local levels of government in rights enforcement. What has been classically described in 
political science as bureaucratic discretion (Dubois, 2010; Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody & 
Musheno, 2003; Weller, 1999) is thus not only reinforced by these new institutional 
arrangements, but also transformed by them, given this unprecedented role allotted to civil 
society organizations in rights allocation. Civil society disability rights advocates therefore 
are put in a position to influence bureaucratic discretion in the implementation of rights. 
Based on interviews with representatives and direct observation of committee meetings, my 
aim is analyze how members of disability rights organizations have defined their advocacy 
role within these committees.   
More precisely, within the framework of an analysis of social movements and rights 
enforcement, my aim is twofold. First, it is to document and analyze a particular type of 
movement institutionalization, to empirically seize the forms and consequences of movement 
entry into local institutions, without making any preliminary assumption regarding possible 
de-radicalizing or co-optation effects. Hence the very open question of “how do movement 
members define their roles in these committees”: is there unity or disunity among movement 
members? How do they intervene in the discussions on individual applications? How do they 
make sense of their participation, what meaning do they give to it and what aspects of 
institutional work, according to them, are important to invest? Working at the local level will 
enable a precise description of the type of relationship that unfolds between associations and 
public authorities, beyond the theoretical distinction between “movement” and “institutions”: 
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what happens when social movements get inside institutions? What do movement members 
concretely do and how do they make sense of what they are doing? To what extent do social 
movements submit to or interiorize institutional norms and constraints, and should this 
socialization be interpreted in terms of institutional domination or movement strategy?  And 
finally, how does their role in service-provision influence movement organizations’ 
definitions and forms of advocacy within institutions? Secondly, my aim is to deepen the 
understanding of what “rights advocacy” means in the field of disability. How are disability 
rights, rights whose definition often remains “vague” in the law6, defined throughout 
participation in these local committees, and what types of action does rights advocacy 
concretely translate into? While disruptive practices such as street protest remain the most 
analyzed forms of rights advocacy
7
, what can be said of what happens at the more discreet 
level of street-level bureaucratic right allocation? Does rights advocacy mean allocating rights 
in the way that suits the best the applicant’s need and entitlement, or does it mean taking into 
account the local chances of rights-effectiveness in the very definition of the rights being 
allocated? Does it mean having a say on each individual file or defining a procedure of 
scrutiny and control over decisions taken by the local authorities? How does participation in 
the committee combine with the possible counseling provided to applicants before they 
submit their applications?  
These are some of the questions I will be addressing based on ethnography of the French 
disability rights movement conducted at the local level (that of the French “departments” or 
départements, the intermediate level of government between municipalities and regions). I 
will first give an overview of the French disability rights movement and the main changes 
introduced by the 2005 disability law, before getting to the movement’s role in the definition 
and allocation of rights at the local level, through applicants counseling and through 
association members’ participation in the local committees in charge or rights allocation. 
From service-provision to advocacy…to rights allocation: the French 
disability right movement, grasped from the local level 
The role disability organizations have come to play in the allocation of disability-related 
rights in France cannot be understood short of a consideration of the history of this movement 
and its role in the development of disability policy. Impairment-specific disability 
organizations, as of the aftermath of the First World War, are the ones which created the first 
facilities and services for disabled people, before the state got involved (Azéma 1999). And 
when the state started intervening, contracting with associations to fund the existing facilities 
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and services was a main form of intervention. Public authorities did not create their own 
public network of facilities and services, but relied on the existing ones managed by 
associations
8
, in a process similar to what was documented in other sectors of social policy in 
France (Lafore 2010). While disability organizations therefore play a structuring role in this 
public policy sector, state intervention reciprocally shaped the movement, first and foremost 
by defining “disability” as a public policy sector as of the main structuring 1975 law, which 
led to the creation of links between impairment specific organizations which initially had very 
few ties with each other (Paterson et al. 2000; Stiker 2009). Even though some more “anti-
establishment” movements, notably student-based, developed in the 1970s (Barral 2007; Ville 
2008:132–133), the sector, even in this period, remained dominated by large, reform-oriented 
organizations that maintain a close relationship with public authorities at different levels of 
government. As Barral stresses “Combining the roles of founders, administrators, employers 
and beneficiaries of the institutions, associations manage 80% of the equipment, a virtual 
monopoly that sanctions their partnership with the government” (Barral 2007:220). This does 
not prevent the same organizations from adopting more confrontational repertoires of action 
when deemed needed. For example, a regrouping of associations called “ni pauvre ni 
soumis
9” (“neither poor nor submissive”, a name which mimics the feminist organization 
“Neither whores nor submissive” – “Ni putes ni soumises”) was created in 2007 to demand an 
increase in the amount of the adult disability benefit (AAH). They organized a major national 
street demonstration in Paris on March, 29
th
, 2008, after several other demonstrations took 
place at the local level in the two previous months. Therefore, the same organizations may 
combine discreet lobbying tactics with more confrontational actions. Inter-organizational 
networks reflect this status both inside and outside institutions, with two parallel groups of 
different statuses: indeed, about the same organizations are represented both within a state-
initiated advisory council, the Conseil national consultative des personnes handicapées 
(CNCPH), and within a more autonomous organization (Comité d’entente, joint committee) 
dating back from the ties between associations that were established during the preparation of 
the 1975 law (“Groupe des 21”). 
My aim here is to grasp this complex reality of the contemporary disability rights movement 
in France by looking at a very particular aspect of the actions of these associations which 
takes place at the local level, which is their participation in the allocation of disability rights. 
This new role granted to disability organizations follows changes introduced by the major 
disability policy reform that took place in France in 2005.  
The 2005 law created a single administrative body in charge of the implementation of 
disability policy at the local level, the Maisons départementales des personnes handicapées 
(MDPH). Within this institution, individual applications are processed by administrative 
teams, but the final decisions are taken by a committee whose 21 members include 7 
representatives of associations. This “disabled persons’ rights and autonomy committee” 
(Commission des droits et de l’autonomie des personnes handicapées, or CDAPH) is the final 
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decision-maker regarding the allocation of all forms of disability related rights, as well as the 
definition of applicant’s entitlement  to specialized institutions or services. For example, this 
committee makes the final decision regarding what type of school a disabled child can apply 
to (mainstream school, in some case with a certain number of hours of individual or shared 
human help – the number of hours being also defined by the CDAPH, or specialized 
“medical-educational” institutions (institut medico-éducatif, IME)). The committee also 
decides whether an applicant may be recognized as a disabled worker, which opens 
entitlement to workplace accomodations (Reconnaissance de la qualité de travailleur 
handicapé, RQTH), as well as whether the applicant may receive disability benefits (Adult 
disability benefit (Allocation d’adulte handicapé, AAH), or Child disability benefit 
(Allocation d’éducation de l’enfant handicapé, AEEH)). Among many other competences, the 
CDAPH is also in charge of defining entitlement to and the amount of a new benefit created 
in 2005 in order to cover part of the special costs linked to disability, the disability 
compensation benefit (Prestation de compensation du handicap, PCH): this benefit can be 
used for example to pay for a wheelchair or other type of technical equipment, for home 
improvement costs (when work is needed to make the home accessible), or for a home helper. 
The fieldwork at the basis of this paper was conducted as part of a broader collective research 
project on French disability policy at the local level (Baudot 2013). The project included the 
study of the local authorities in charge of disability rights allocation at the local level, the 
Maisons départementales des personnes handicapées, or MDPH, in four departments. Our 
team spent about a week doing fieldwork in each department, each of us specializing in a 
particular aspect of the MDPH’s inner workings and environment (users, litigation, and civil 
society organizations). I studied the role of disability rights organizations, with a priority 
focus on the organizations which are represented in the MDPH’s “rights and autonomy 
committee” which is formally in charge of allocating disability rights. These organizations 
often are the same from one department to the other, and belong to national federations of 
associations which are the most prominent voices of the movement at the national level 
(mainly APF, UNAPEI, UNAFAM, APAJH, PEP, AFM). Most of them manage facilities and 
services, and their boards are mainly composed of parents and “close relatives” of people with 
disabilities, as opposed to the latter themselves (they are organizations “for”, rather than “of” 
disabled people (Vanhala 2011:156)). Exceptions notably include two mobility-impairment 
organizations, the Association des paralyses de France (APF) and the Association française 
contre les myopathies (AFM), as well as several associations (which often differ from one 
department to the other) in the field of hearing and visual impairments which encourage the 
participation of people with disabilities. The study was primarily based upon semi-structured 
interviews with association volunteers (N=33) and facility and service managers (N=13). The 
interviews almost all took place on the premises of the different associations, facilities and 
services, which gave me occasions of direct observation. The interview transcripts were coded 
using Atlas.Ti. I also observed four sessions of “rights and autonomy committees” in three 
different departments.   
Representing one third of the committee members, associations are in a position to actually 
have a say in the allocation of rights at the local level, even though they do not have decision-
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making power as such, being a minority. However, their influence on the way rights are 
defined and implemented at the local level also rests on other aspects notably linked to their 
management of almost all of the facilities and services in the disability sector. Hence, before 
the commission, they play a part in the preparation of individual applications, as well as, to 
some extent, in their evaluation within the MDPH. And after the commission, the facilities 
and services managed by the associations are the ones that have the ultimate power to make 
some of the rights allocated a reality. This involvement around the committee will be 
analyzed first, before turning to the way disability organizations make sense of their presence 
in the committee as such. 
The role of third sector disability organizations in the preparation and 
evaluation of individual applications 
The role of civil society organizations in access to rights having been documented in other 
sectors in France (Lejeune 2011), and in an analogy with the prominent role of social 
movements in accompanying individual right claims in front of the Courts (Manfredi 2004; 
McCann 1994, 2006; Vanhala 2011), one of the aims of the investigation was to assess the 
extent of support provided by associations in the preparation of individual applications. It 
soon appeared that two very different aspects of the organizations’ role had to be 
distinguished in this respect. Indeed, associations do not only play a role as voluntary 
organizations (and as such, their part seems rather limited), but they also manage facilities and 
services whose professionals almost systematically take part in application renewals for their 
registered users.  
Volunteers’ limited role 
Many voluntary board members note applicants’ lack of knowledge of their rights, stressing 
the fact that they would need more information in order to actually have access to the full 
range of rights they are entitled to. As the board member of an organization mainly 
advocating for mobility-impaired people, who also sits at a CDAPH, stresses: 
I don’t know whether people are really aware of their rights. I mean, of exactly what they 
are entitled to, because their rights, they might say “I may be entitled to disability 
compensation benefit”, but I mean, in terms of the number of hours of home helper [that 
will be paid for by the benefit], I think a lot of people easily accept what they are offered. 
[…]There are people who do not belong to associations, and we come to think that these 
people, they get  - not “had” – but they are offered this and they accept it, and that’s it, 
but maybe they could have more.  
However, this general diagnosis regarding the lack of legal information does not translate into 
the institutionalization of permanent legal information services within civil society 
organizations, apart from a few exceptions such as the FNATH, which notably specializes in 
litigation following workplace injuries (Lejeune and Revillard 2012), and the AFM, which is 
close to the field of other patient’s rights organizations. In most other organizations, there is 
no permanent voluntary service in charge of helping applicants. People asking for advice 
regarding their applications generally are redirected to the social services of the MDPH. 
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While this reflects a refusal to help applicants directly, this redirection may be of some help to 
the applicant compared to a direct contact with the MDPH, in so far as associations 
sometimes direct applicant to very specific people within the institution, who specialize in the 
kind of issues they are dealing with (schooling, employment, etc.). For example, this excerpt 
by two interviewees who volunteer for a psychic disability association, while revealing that 
not many people come to the association for this type of advice (5 in a given year), illustrates 
how specific contacts can be given to such people: 
Q: Before the CDAPH, do some people come and ask you at the association for advice on 
how to file their applications? 
A1: Not very often. Some people do, but not systematically. [turning to another 
volunteer] Did many people come and ask us for advice on how to file their MDPH 
applications? 
A2: We have 5 requests of this kind per year. And we delegate a lot. Sometimes I give 
them - they call us to ask for information, I give them an appointment, but we don’t fill in 
the document for them. We hand over to – if it is child-related, to the person in charge of 
the childhood department [at the MDPH]; and if it is an adult, if it is work-related, Mrs X 
[person in charge of the department at the MDPH]; if it is for an institution… we hand 
over to the MDPH.  
Therefore, even though some volunteers within associations may offer their help upon request 
on an individual level, there is a shared assumption, among most associations, that counseling 
regarding application filing is the MDPH’s job.  
And what I am saying is that the MDPH are not doing their job properly because people 
don’t know their rights. […] To be sure, when clients come in and their files are 
incomplete, they will ask for complements: “I need the medical record, this is missing, 
you should bring in photos…”. This, they will say. But all the counseling that should go 
along, this is not done.  
Refusal to institutionalize this type of counseling within the voluntary sector partly 
corresponds to a will to exert pressure on the MDPH in order to avoid attempts to delegate 
what is considered a public service to the third-sector. But it also derives from the lack of time 
and volunteers for this type of work. Finally, it reflects a reluctance, on the part of some 
association leaders (predominantly middle to upper middle-class retired white males, often 
members of the local notability) to assume a role that is assimilated to a form a “dirty work” 
(Hughes 1958) provided by social workers (assistantes sociales, a predominantly female 
activity in France) as opposed to the more noble, “political” tasks of “representation” that they 
conceive as the core of their mission as board members. This appears quite literally in the 
following quote by a board president who, after describing the volunteers’ role in helping 
people identify the right contact within the MDPH, stresses that their involvement does not 
include a more active help in application filing because “we are not social workers”: 
Q: So you will not necessarily be providing a more active help on the details of the 
application? Like, helping people file their applications or things like that? 
A: No. Not necessarily, no. I try to avoid it. There are people whose job it is. I mean, we 
are not social workers. I try not to play that game. I do have a role in informing, helping 
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families in need, we must help them. But no, we are not social workers. Each of us must 
stay in their own place. […] Some time ago, I was in [a different chapter of the 
association] where the president, his wife was a social worker. She received the families 
in her own home. [After work] she came back to work on the applications from home. 
No. I already spend 33 hours per week [for the association], that is already some time.  
This last reference to the counter-example of the wife of the president of another chapter of 
the association who was a social worker and provided applicants with this type of help well 
illustrates the gender and “dirty work” dimensions of presidents’ reluctance to assume this 
role. This, as well as the idea of “helping people in need”, also reveals the fact that counseling 
people regarding their applications is read in terms of charity, or at the most, in terms of 
traditional social work, and not in terms of empowerment and facilitating access to rights. To 
be sure, this vision is not systematically shared among associations, but the simple fact that 
most association leaders are not too keen on institutionalizing this mission in their structures 
reflects the fact that it not given much political meaning. It is seen as “help”, rather than 
empowerment. Beyond the fact that most associations do not provide permanent structures for 
this type of counseling, this also translated into associations’ refusal to offer this type of 
counseling on a voluntary basis within the MDPH, when asked to do so. In one of the 
departments studied, the associations collectively refused, and in another, only 2 associations 
accepted.    
However, as suggested earlier, some volunteers do accept to provide advice on an individual 
basis, even though this type of service is not institutionalized within the structure. Such is for 
example the case of a volunteer whose association refused to have office hours devoted to 
counseling at the MDPH, but who receives applicants up until late at night at her home in 
order to help them with their applications: 
They [the association leaders] believe that the associations should not replace 
institutions, that the institutional people… [should be doing the job]. But I believe that if 
we keep kicking the ball back and forth to each other, we are never going to get out of 
this.  
Based on the four departments studied, I have found provision of administrative counseling to 
applicants to be more common in associations in which the volunteers/board members are 
themselves disabled people: in France, this is mainly the case of some associations 
specializing in mobility-impairment as well as visual and hearing impairments. Examples of 
the types of advice provided include “not making useless claims” (E27) (claims that have no 
chance to succeed, implicitly because it tends to annoy MDPH people), help in the writing of 
the applicant’s “life project”, advice on the mentions and details that are needed in the 
medical certificates, and possibly on the local doctors who best know how to fill these in. This 
quote by a volunteer in the field of visual impairment reflects how useful this type of 
knowledge regarding the local practitioners might be: 
Q: What kinds of things will you typically be giving people advice about? 
A: I mainly advise people regarding the medical certificate. I explain them what they 
must ask their doctor for, what the doctor must write down. […] The thing is, I am under 
the impression that there are – well, true enough, doctors are overbooked – but doctors 
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tend to be casual regarding the certificates they must fill in. In fact, there is a very clear 
difference, even between eye doctors, when you look at how they fill in the certificate. It 
is clear. Very clear. Here, there are two of them who fill in the certificates very well, with 
the pictures and all, everything that is needed, but the others…  
In other cases, the involvement of associations in pre-application counseling may take on a 
more political meaning, being part of a struggle to improve disability rights by promoting in 
some cases a broad implementation, which would go beyond legal prescriptions. Such is 
particularly the case of the Association des paralyses de France (APF), one of the main 
associations that struggle for the improvement of disability rights (its constituency being 
mainly based on mobility impairment) at the national level. In the following excerpt, the head 
of a local chapter of the association insists on the usefulness of associative counseling in order 
to tell people about the “tricks” beyond the “administrative answer”, and tells us about an 
individual case on which their “social worker10” is currently working, which involves trying 
to get entitlement to disability benefit to an applicant in spite of his spousal situation putting 
him out of the legal range of entitlement: 
Q: Before the CDAPH, do you have many members asking you for advice on how to write 
or build their applications? 
A : Yes, we have a lot of requests, because the MDPH remains… So, there was this will to 
create a one-stop shop [when the MDPH was created], which is already something. But 
still there is, for writing the application or the life project – this is why we have hired a 
voluntary social worker, in fact – that is, in preparing for the application, we can offer 
counseling. Because people do not necessarily know, even if they ask the MDPH. An 
administrative answer is what they will get. They do not know all the tricks, what can be 
accepted, what cannot be accepted, where you can… That’s it. And then, […] we have 
this case, the social worker is currently working on a really blatant case, it is a household 
with two kids. He is with disability, she works for the minimum wage. He doesn’t get the 
AAH [disability benefit] because she is on the minimum wage. So we are fighting so that 
he however gets part of the benefit […].  
Even though this interviewee does not comment on it, this attempt, at the local level, to get 
disability benefit to an applicant who legally is not eligible due to his spouse’s income, 
mirrors the association’s current fight, at the national level, to legally disconnect individual 
benefit entitlement from the spouse’s income11. 
However, this type of attempt to use applications in order to improve rights allocation 
practices beyond what is legally prescribed (with the hope to eventually favor legal change 
and enshrine new rights in the law, in a manner similar to strategic constitutional litigation) is 
generally rare. The main conclusion remains the weakness of legal/administrative service 
provision at the level of voluntary organizations. 
                                                 
10
 This local chapter of the association indeed has “hired” a voluntary social worker - an exception to the general 
conclusion we have drawn earlier 
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 In a classic process of frame extension, in the context of the French debate on same-sex marriage, the APF 
issued a press release entitled “Marriage for all except for disability benefits recipients” (“marriage for all” was 
the motto of same-sex marriage advocates): APF, “Le mariage pour tous sauf pour les bénéficiaires de 
l'allocation adulte handicapé”, Faire face (APF blog), 12/02/2013  http://www.faire-
face.fr/archive/2013/02/06/le-mariage-pour-tous-sauf-pour-les-beneficiaires-de-l-alloca.html (Snow et al. 1986) 
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Facility and service managers’ systematic involvement  
Volunteers are far from being the only actors involved in associations in the field of disability, 
since many of these associations also manage highly professionalized institutions  and 
services, which hire personnel mainly within social care, educational and health occupations : 
these include “medical-educational” institutions (institut medico-éducatif, IME), sheltered 
employment facilities and services (Etablissements et services d’aide par le travail, ESAT), 
medical care/nursing homes (Foyers d’accueil médicalisé, FAM/Maisons d’accueil 
specialisé, MAS), social support services (services d’accompagnement à la vie sociale, 
SAVS).   
These institutions play a significant role in counseling their users regarding their MDPH 
applications. Indeed, applications for disability rights (be they benefits, disability 
compensation, or assignment to a given institution or service) must be renewed on a regular 
basis; therefore being accepted in a given service or facility does not mean the end of 
administrative procedures for applicants. However, the main difference for them is that once 
they come under a given service or institution, their MDPH applications are generally closely 
supervised by the latter. Indeed, unlike what was described earlier in the voluntary side of 
associations, the function of user counseling regarding MDPH applications is quite 
systematically institutionalized within the services and institutions managed by the 
associations : depending on their size, these generally include a person specifically in charge 
of this mission, and in some cases a whole “social service”.  
This involvement in users counseling does not only or even necessarily derive from a 
commitment to disability rights advocacy, but also mainly from the fact that the outcomes of 
users’ applications are decisive in defining the services’ public, and the characteristics and 
behavior of their public is perceived as the main source of uncertainty by facility and service 
managers, an uncertainty which they will logically try to reduce (Crozier and Friedberg 1977). 
Indeed, these publicly-funded institutions and services cannot – and do not – “recruit” a user 
without a CDAPH notification; they cannot legally put an end to the management/care of a 
patient without a CDAPH notification either, even though compliance with the procedure 
seems less systematic at this end of the process (a few cases of users being fired from 
sheltered employment (ESAT) without or in spite of CDAPH notification have been 
reported). This means that the profile of the institutions’ public (who gets in and who gets out) 
can only be defined within the borders of the MDPH’s decisions. Institutions however 
generally keep a significant margin of autonomy within this perimeter, given the situation of 
the market in the field of disability facilities and services: indeed, institutions have an 
obligation to follow-up on CDAPH’s decisions provided that they still have vacancy. In other 
terms, if the CDAPH notifies a certain type of facility or service for a person, this facility or 
service must accept this user provided they still have available room. For most services, 
demand is largely higher that supply; hence the institutions keep a margin of autonomy, being 
completely autonomous in the management of their waiting list (the MDPH has no power to 
impose priority of access or to define a rule for managing the waiting list, such as “first come, 
first served”). However, it still matters, for institutions, to be able to control to some extent 
the notifications that are made by the MDPH, and they also need to avoid the situation in 
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which their users would find themselves – and put the institution – in a difficult position due 
to failure to renew their applications. Hence, apart from their possible commitment to 
disability rights advocacy, it is in the interest of disability institutions managers to ensure that 
their users are up to date in their administrative procedures, and possibly, as will be shown 
below, to try to influence decisions regarding new users by taking a part in the evaluation 
process within the MDPH. In one case, the MDPH even appears to have encouraged a service 
to provide such counseling, according to a medical-educational institution manager: 
The MDPH appointed social workers to help with writing up the applications. Except that 
they found at it worked more or less, and they asked us to help the families. In the 
beginning, we helped those who came, and then we decided to work on all the 
applications, and in fact, the applications are filed from the institution, in relation with 
the family of course. For us, it is also a guarantee […] not to find ourselves with nothing 
at the end of the period of time initially notified by the MDPH.  
Indeed, all the service managers I have met argue that their recommendations regarding 
people they have helped are almost systematically followed by the MDPH. For example, these 
two managers in charge of several sheltered employment institutions mention only one case, 
during the course of a year, in which the MDPH did not follow the institution’s demand: 
Q: Concretely, does the MDPH follow you?... If you work on 90% of the applications [of 
the disabled workers who work in your facilities] before they are submitted […], does the 
CDAPH generally follow you, afterwards? 
A1: Yes. 
A2: Always. If you take, for example, last year, I think that the only request that was not 
validated – and it is understandable – is a request for an exit12 from an establishment 
because we were faced with very, very high absenteeism on the part of the disabled 
worker. We had had a whole procedure with the MDPH, we had referred to them on 
several occasions, and finally, we decided to request an exit from the establishment, and 
they – how should I put it? – refused it, because for them, even though the absences 
were numerous, this was, for this person, the only remaining social link. We understood 
it. For us, it seemed consistent to ask for it, but we accepted [the decision] and at the 
same time, we committed to follow-up with them on the person’s absences. Generally 
speaking, they follow us.  
Significantly, the case in point was a case of “exit” from an establishment, a case which 
illustrates how management logics (here, the aim to avoid to many absences on the part of a 
disabled worker) may interfere with the defense of disabled workers’ rights (a defense which 
translates here into the CDAPH’s defense of a right for the worker to remain in the institution 
in spite of his numerous absences, in the name of the preservation of his social integration). 
The general success of the recommendations made by the managers of institutions and 
services (apart from such – significant – exceptions) largely derives from their close 
knowledge of the users (who are present in their services on a day-to-day basis) and the 
administrative procedures, as well as the role they actually come to play in the evaluation 
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 « Exit of establishment » (sortie d’établissement) concretely means here that the sheltered employment 
institution wishes to lay off a worker. 
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process. Indeed the MDPH relies a lot on the expertise of the institutions, by means of 
different channels: the technical teams in charge of the evaluation of individual applications 
within the MDPH may ask the local institutions and services for advice regarding the possible 
appointment of users, and even ask them to accept an applicant for a short period in order to 
“test” the relevance of a given appointment; professionals from the institutions may also sit on 
the evaluation boards of the MDPH (the multidisciplinary boards that proceed to the 
evaluation of individual applications and present the CDAPH with a decision proposal, before 
the final decision is made by the CDAPH); finally, and especially in departments where there 
is a lack of medical specialists, specialized medical practitioners (such as psychiatrists) may 
work part-time for the MDPH and for different institutions. 
To sum up, the involvement of facility and service managers in application renewals is more 
systematic and institutionalized than the counseling of (generally first-time) applicants by the 
volunteers of the organizations that often own these facilities and services. This participation 
in the application process, which mainly derives from a management logic (controlling who 
gets in and who gets out, in order to control to some extent the public’s profile), can easily be 
understood drawing on organizational theory rather than social movement theory. In other 
terms, the same action (helping someone with their disability rights application) that we 
initially envisioned as part of a social movement tactic to promote rights enforcement, 
actually may take on a very different meaning when performed by professionals in an 
institutional context. This raises important questions regarding the frontiers and definition of 
advocacy: to what extent can advocacy be substantially defined by the actors or the actions 
involved? If not, must one take into account the effects (effectiveness of the rights for the 
applicants, capacity to enforce rights beyond what is legally prescribed…) or the intention, the 
meaning conveyed to the action by the actors (advocacy or professional management of a 
population)? Beyond this particular case of disability advocacy, this case study sheds light on 
structural ambivalences of institutional advocacy that we have previously analyzed in other 
contexts, the promotion of human rights by the French Ombudsman (Revillard 2010; 
Revillard et al. 2011), and the definition of gender equality policy by women’s rights 
advocates within the state (Bereni and Revillard 2011, 2012; Revillard 2007). As we will see, 
these ambivalences linked to advocating in a bureaucratic context also unfold at the level of 
participation in the CDAPH. 
Defining a form of rights advocacy adjusted to institutional constraints: 
associations in the rights and autonomy committees 
Before analyzing the participation of association volunteers in the rights and autonomy 
committees of the MDPH, it is important to stress, in relation with the previous section, that 
service and institutions managers also play a role at this stage. As such, “representatives of 
organizations that manage services and institutions” are legally granted two advisory seats on 
the committee (they don’t have the right to vote). But beyond this, in practice, some 
associations also send their managers or members of the professional staff of their services 
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and establishments to sit as representatives of the association
13
. Therefore, the influence of 
local facilities and services does not end at the door of the CDAPH.  
Turning to  association representatives more generally speaking, this section aims at analyzing 
the forms taken by advocacy in this particular context which is both strongly institutionalized, 
and where the main official logic of action is the allocation of rights on an individual basis. 
This formal definition of the CDAPH’s mission first invites us to look at the way association 
representatives advocate for disability rights during the discussions on individual applications. 
But the direct observation of the actual functioning of the committee, as well as the interviews 
with association representatives, also lead us to shift the focus of analysis – as these civil 
society organizations themselves have shifted their focus of advocacy – from the involvement 
in the defense of each individual case to a mobilization aiming at the norms of functioning of 
the committee. Indeed, because of constraints tied to the number of individual files to process 
and the limited time spent in committee (constraints that are largely integrated by association 
members themselves), only a small part of the applications that are submitted to the MDPH 
are actually presented in front of and discussed by the CDAPH. In this context, disability 
rights advocacy tends to take the form of the defense of a right of oversight on MDPH 
decisions, making the MDPH accountable, rather than actually participating in the decision-
making process on each individual application. 
Speed-advocacy? The defense of disability rights within a quick decision-making 
process 
Given the time constraints of the CDAPH, associations representatives, when they intervene, 
have to make their point rather quickly (even though the time devoted to each individual case 
being discussed varies a lot from one department to the other, for example in one of the 
department studied an average of 6 minutes was spent on each application). Although 
association volunteer leaders as well as institutional actors in the field of disability tend to 
theorize a sharp distinction between the “activist” or “political” stance of the volunteers and 
the “technical” or “expert” point of view of the service and institution managers, both the 
observation of the nature of the interactions within the CDAPH and the volunteer leader’s 
accounts of their participation in the commission show that expertise is the dominant mode of 
intervention, including on the part of “activists”. In the semi-structured interviews, when I ask 
volunteer association leaders about why participating in CDAPH meetings matters for them, 
in the answers the shift from the lexical field of rights to that of expertise is very common: 
Q: According to you, what does it bring to be present at the CDAPH? What it the interest 
for associations to be present in this type of instance? 
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 The question of who should sit as “association representative” (whether it should only be volunteers or also 
professionals) is not settled by law, so it varies according to the local practices of both the different associations 
and the MDPH. For example, the APF decided as a national policy of the association that board members, 
generally people themselves with disabilities, should be the ones serving on CDAPHs. In one of the departments 
we studied, the MDPH director recommended that associations be represented by volunteers rather than by 
professionals, in order to have an “activist point of view” represented within the committee, rather than a 
“technical” one (that is assumed to be that of the managers/professionals). 
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A: The interest is the defense of people with disabilities. Well, I do not mean that they 
would not be well defended otherwise. If we weren’t here, maybe it would work the 
same way, this is something we cannot say. But, well, we do see that on the applications 
we intervene on, we do bring in our knowledge, because not everybody is necessarily 
aware of everything, and it helps a lot. 
Another volunteer president, belonging to a local deaf people organization, argues that 
associations bring in a specific expertise to the MDPH: 
Within the CDAPH, I think association representatives have brought in skills that were 
specific to them. Let me give you an example. MDPH technicians, in general, knew very 
little about deafness. So regarding certain questions, they did not know how to proceed. 
The [MDPH] director had organized a meeting with us, with associations in the field of 
deafness, to say: “Here we are, on these issues, what is your opinion? How will we 
proceed?”.  At some point it was about hearing aids, and all. Because it’s true that since 
it is very specific, there were not many technicians, indeed, that mastered the subject. 
Facing what they describe as a lack of knowledge of the issues by MDPH technicians or other 
representatives in the CDAPH, association members put forward an expertise based on their 
experience of or closeness to the disability being discussed, when representatives are 
themselves disabled people, parents of disabled people, or can put forward their closeness to 
the disability at hand they have acquired through their voluntary work. In doing so, they may 
encounter difficulties when put in a position to discuss the medical diagnosis and assessment 
of the level of the bodily or mental dysfunctions (which partly conditions access to some of 
the benefits), because of the superior legitimacy of medical knowledge and because of the 
very partial access they get to elements of the medical record (due both to a reluctance of 
MDPH medical practitioners who put forward medical confidentiality, and to the limited time 
spent on each application during the CDAPH). However, their contribution often turns out 
more efficient, and is perceived as more legitimate
14
, when it is based on a description of the 
experience of disability in daily life, the concrete obstacles the applicant may face in terms of 
mobility and autonomy, and consequently the amount of support/compensation needed. This 
input proves all the more important in the context of the 2005 law which promotes a more 
social definition of disability than what was previously commonly used in France, and defines 
a “rights to compensation” by means of the PCH. Association representatives therefore often 
put forward these arguments in the context of discussions of PCH applications. For example, 
this president of an association in the field of visual impairment, who himself is blind, 
demonstrates the consequences of partial visual impairment on daily life in order to argue in 
favor of a better compensation of the disability, a situation which he compares with that of 
total blindness, which opens access to a fixed rate of PCH (forfait cécité) and is therefore 
relatively more easily to compensate for within the framework of the current administrative 
procedures: 
When you can’t see well, it’s hard. [For example if] you have retinitis pigmentosa: well, 
when there is too much light, you cannot see; when you go from light to the shade, you 
cannot see either. How do people move from one place to the other? How do people 
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 Given the small number of CDAPH directly observed (4), my analysis here is mainly based, at this stage, on 
interviews with association representatives, and should be considered as a very preliminary finding. 
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communicate? If you go to a train station, nothing is accessible to the visually impaired. 
For someone who is visually impaired, when you see the height at which they put the 
timetables: nothing [you can see nothing]. You wait 20 minutes15, you’re going to hear 
the voice, and then you still need to know where you are [in order to be able to locate 
your train]. We, when one is blind, there is no problem, we have the blindness standard 
rate (forfait cécité); and I am lucky enough to have colleagues who come and pick me up, 
my wife and all, but not everybody is as lucky as I am. Some people live alone, and how 
do they move from one place to the other, to go somewhere? Nothing is adapted. 
Everything goes through the eye in today’s society.95% of information goes through the 
eye. We, we only have left the senses of touch, smell and hearing. And we must 
compensate, with these three senses, for 95% of what a seeing person has. [Addressing 
me] You turn your head, you take a look, you immediately see what is displayed. Us, we 
need to ask, we need to find someone. But this, this is ground experience. In CDAPH, I 
explain this to them. And then they tell me: “This is very technical”. I say: “Yes, but it is 
the ground reality”.   
The expertise put forward by association members in CDAPH may also take the form of 
indeed very technical aspects, typically regarding different types of equipment: why such an 
expensive wheelchair is needed based on the person’s impairment, how such hearing aid will 
help the applicant in their daily life, etc. 
Given that expertise is public administration’s constitutive language (Nass 1986; Weber 
2003), this position of associations as purveyors of expertise within the CDAPH is strategic 
on a double level: in view of the applicant’s interest (for it is likely to increase the chances of 
success of the claim), and in view of the association’s credibility facing administrative 
actors
16
.  
However, it is not the only possible one. Association representatives also intervene based on a 
defense of fundamental principles and rights. For example, in the following excerpt, a 
volunteer belonging to an association in the field of mobility impairment, himself in a 
wheelchair, recalls his intervention on a case discussed by the committee, where a disabled 
man, who could not use his arms and had full-time human help at home, was asking for 
financial compensation for the purchase of an automated garage door with a piece of 
equipment that would enable him to open the door by himself (using his mouth). Other 
members of the CDAPH argued against the allocation of the compensation benefit for this use 
based on the fact that he had full-time human help and therefore “the lady” [the helper] could 
open the garage door if needed. Against this stand, this representative argued that 
compensation was legitimate on the basis of a defense of the disabled person’s autonomy: 
 […] There was this man who needed an automated garage door, indeed, because he 
didn’t have his arms; he pressed with his mouth. But, there was always someone with 
him, at his place. So we heard: “But why does he want a door at such a price when there 
is someone at his place?”. So, that is what I explained: the man, even if there is someone 
at his place, what if he wants to do things on his own? 
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 Trains in France are supposed to be announced 20 minutes before departure 
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 This strategic use of expertise by rights advocates within the administration, in terms of both legitimacy and 
efficiency, has also been documented regarding women’s rights (Banaszak 2010; Katzenstein 1998; Revillard 
2009) 
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Q: It’s a matter of autonomy. 
A : It’s a matter of autonomy. And [our organization], we promote this. And then I was 
told [by other members of the commission] : “No, I don’t see why… There is someone at 
his place. The lady, she can come and open…”. I said: “No, this is not what we want. Just 
because someone is there doesn’t mean that the lady, she comes open the door. So 
that’s it. In each case when there is someone at home [they say]: “The lady, she’ll do it”. 
No. We already have to bear with our impairment, so if on top of that we cannot do 
things by ourselves a little… [But that’s the idea:] We won’t pay for a garage door 
because someone else can take care of it”.  
Here, the ideas put forward by the organization at the national level (“we promote this”) find a 
direct illustration in the defense of an individual case, and the defense of autonomy may seem 
all the more legitimate since it takes place within a “rights and autonomy” committee. The 
defense of principles is put forward against the consideration of cost, which, notably 
regarding a piece of equipment that is deemed unnecessary (an automated garage door as 
opposed to a wheelchair for example), along with the idea according to which “the lady can 
do it”, is what is at the root of the other members’ opposition.  
In other cases, association members may intervene (they are, however, not the only ones to do 
so) on the basis of a stress put on human situations in order to allocate rights even though the 
legal conditions are not strictly respected, as opposed to a more rigid application of the texts. 
For example, the same representative recalls the case of a person who, when his case was 
discussed by the CDAPH, was just about to get out of the hospital within 8 days and needed a 
wheelchair. His claim to disability compensation benefit to pay for his wheelchair had been 
rejected by the MDPH technical team because the applicant had only provided the MDPH 
with one estimate, as opposed to the two estimates that are officially required. Mobilizing his 
technical expertise, the interviewee stresses the fact that only one provider exits in France for 
this type of wheelchair. But he also condemns what he describes as a too rigid implementation 
of the “2 estimates” rule by MDPH members, which in this case leads to an applicant having 
to stay in bed: 
 […] often, what I am saying is… these doctors around the table, sometimes, they are a 
little tough, because if they were in the situation of the people [whose applications they 
are discussing], I think they wouldn’t think the same way. I mean, it’s my opinion. […] It is 
a good thing that we are here because we can explain. Because when they refuse a 
wheelchair, me, I say, “sometimes, you refuse that, ok, because you think it is expensive”. 
For example, there was a person who was about to come out of the hospital 8 days later, 
they refused the wheelchair. I asked them: “now explain me how the person is going to 
do”. I mean, there are some MDPH where they are more flexible. But here, they are 
pretty much into the legal stuff. They won’t deviate even one tiny bit. But then, you 
know, the applicants, they are in trouble. […] Sometimes they say: “No, it can’t make it 
because it is too expensive, because we need 2 estimates”. […] In this particular case, 
there was only one estimate because only one provider sells this type of wheelchair. And 
yet they wouldn’t accept it. There was a vote by show of hands, and we lost, because we 
were two voices short; and then I said : “So explain this to me : this man who is going to 
go out of the hospital, he is going to stay at home laying down because he won’t have a 
wheelchair. Now you explain this to me”. 
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Q : ok, so in this case, they say : “go and get a second estimate and come back to us”? 
A: That’s it. Sometimes I even get mad, even though I remain polite, but I really get 
upset; and they say: “There’s no use in getting so upset”. But sometimes, when you see 
some of the things… Within the CDAPH, it’s complicated. You need to be able to defend 
yourself. Because it’s tough. Even the doctors who are around the table. The time she 
[the doctor who had assessed the case] refused the wheelchair, in my head, I told myself 
: “You’d better not get unlucky one day because…”. I mean, when people are affected, 
you see the difference. But then, what I am saying is, when we are in the CDAPH, it is the 
law, pure and simple. That’s the way I see it. That’s the way I feel it. And the doctor 
always goes: “yes, but the [evaluation] grid doesn’t say that”. Well, yeah, maybe the grid 
doesn’t say, but there you go.  
Even though these two excerpts illustrate classical advocacy stands, in which the user’s right 
are promoted over any other (procedural, financial) consideration, association representative’s 
positioning often is more complex. Indeed, even reasoning within a logic of advocacy, 
because their action unfolds at the local level and because they are generally aware of the 
limited locally available means (all the more so since they manage services and institutions 
themselves), associations representatives often find themselves confronted with dilemmas 
regarding the best way to define the allocation of rights in order for these rights to be 
enforced. The debate around “second-best decisions” (orientations par défaut) perfectly 
illustrates these dilemmas. This takes place in the context of applications to institutions and 
services. The “second-best decisions” debate refers to the fact that CDAPH members often 
make their decisions knowing that the best solution for the applicant currently is not available 
in the department (for example, sheltered employment the best solution for an young adult 
currently in a medical-institutional institute, but there are currently no positions available in 
the department institutes, and the waiting lists are already very long). They therefore find 
themselves in a position to allocate a right knowing that this right cannot be enforced. The 
dilemma they are faced with is either to make their decision only according to the applicant’s 
needs, but knowing that their decision cannot be enforced, or to make their decisions taking 
into account the constraint of available means, which leads them to decide in favor of a 
“second-best” solution. While the refusal of “second-best solutions” often is presented as one 
of the hallmarks of associations representation in CDAPH (and notably, an orientation that 
would differentiate the position of volunteers from that of professional managers of 
institutions and services), association representatives in fact are quite ambivalent about this 
when they comment about this dilemma in the interviews. Their awareness of the local 
situation is such that they don’t necessarily try to make a point that a decision closer to the 
applicant’s need would be best to the applicant. A more commonly found argument against 
“second-best decisions” is the idea that deciding only based on the applicant’s needs, even 
though it is not necessarily in the applicant’s best interest (since the decision might be 
impossible to implement, as opposed to a second-best decision), helps shed light on the lack 
of local resources, and can be used as a leverage to lobby in favor of the creation of new 
structures or services in the department. Finally, a solution that is commonly used in several 
departments is the use of “double-decisions” (doubles notifications), that is, decisions that 
include two options, with the one that suits best the applicant’s needs listed first, and then the 
“second-best” solution that has more chances to be implemented. However, this common 
20 
 
solution of the “double decision” also is subject to criticism on the part of some organization 
leaders who point that institution and service managers may be less prone to implement the 
first solution if they see that a second-best is listed. Therefore, this issue remains a point of 
controversy among association representatives, a controversy which reveals the very concrete 
difficulties faced by rights advocates when advocacy takes into account the variable 
anticipated effectiveness of the rights that are thereby allocated. 
While functioning as a place for advocacy, the CDAPH also is a site where “social movement 
disunity” may be revealed (Barnartt & Scotch, 2001 : 111). Association representatives 
broadly share a common, implicit conception of representation according to which their role 
should not be impairment-specific: each of them represents disability at large and should take 
part in the discussion on all the application, no matter what type of impairment is involved. At 
the same time, associations are in fact for the most part impairment-specific, and their 
nomination as CDAPH members follows a criterion of representativeness of the different 
kinds of disabilities. Association representatives generally bridge the hiatus between the ideal 
conception of a universalist representation and the reality of impairment-specific 
organizations by defending the idea according to which they are “interested” in all cases, yet 
tend to intervene more on the applications that deal with “their” disability, given their 
impairment-specific expertise. However, in some instances on the discussion of specific 
cases, conflicts of interests between impairment-specific organizations appear. This is for 
example the case when a broadening of entitlement to a given right is perceived as 
diminishing the chances of effectiveness of the right at stake for each constituency. In the 
following excerpt, a member of a mobility-impairment association criticizes the CDAPH’s 
tendency to grant parking card to people “who walk”, implicitly because if too many people 
are entitled to disabled parking spots, the spots will get harder to access for each of them, and 
notably for people in wheelchairs, who, according to him, need them the most: 
And then, sitting at the rights and autonomy committee also means asserting a 
particular vision in front of our local authorities. The CDAPH can be, in relation with 
individual applications that we defend, we can actually convey certain values of our 
organization. So, take for example, parking cards. […] it is true that parking cards can be 
issued – and we are very, very careful about that – can even be issued to people who 
walk. I mean, there isn’t much monitoring on the parking cards because they are easy to 
issue and they don’t cost anything. So, since it doesn’t cost any money, they pay less 
attention to the delivering of parking cards. We have often voiced this preoccupation, 
this issue [in front of the CDAPH], saying: “No, we must be careful. It is really for people 
who have trouble walking”.  
The potential exposure of social movement disunity in front of representatives of public 
authorities helps understand one of the functions of another type of movement implication in 
the CDAPH, the mobilization around the committee’s norms of functioning. Indeed, this type 
of mobilization, which will be the subject of the next section, helps recreate a form of 
movement unity, as opposed to the specialized nature of the expertise mobilized in the 
discussions of individual applications, as well as the potential conflicts of interests that can 
emerge throughout these discussions. However, as we will see, the main rationale behind this 
type of mobilization around the CDAPH’s norms of functioning is the constraint of the 
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number of files, interiorized by disability organizations, which leads them to re-define their 
role in terms of scrutiny and control over MDPH decisions, short of being able to actually 
take part in the decision-making process on each individual application. 
From decision-maker to watchdog: Rights advocacy through a mobilization 
around the committee’s inner workings 
Beyond the analysis of the way associations representatives position themselves in the 
CDAPH’s discussions on the individual applications, the meaning of associations presence in 
the committee must be analyzed in light of the CDAPH’s actual working, which departs from 
its legal definition.  While according to its constitutive decree
17
, the CDAPH is the MDPH’s 
final decision-maker (each individual application is supposed to be subject to a decision by 
the committee), MDPH practices significantly depart from these this requirement, with 
institutional practices varying significantly from one department to the other, as well as in 
time : in 3 of the 4 departments under study, reforms regarding the CDAPH’s norms of 
functioning were being discussed, and occasioned significant mobilization on the part of civil 
society organizations. The institutional adjustments at stake are interesting to study both in 
terms of identifying the way movement advocacy shifts from participation in decision-making 
to a mobilization around procedures, and in terms of analyzing the dilemmas of intra-
institutional advocacy for disability rights advocates.  
In practice, even though each decision officially is the committee’s, the latter only examines a 
very small number of individual files. Indeed, the creation of the MDPH in 2006 quickly led 
to the shared conclusion that the CDAPH could not examine all individual files because of the 
number of applications to be processed. Each local MDPH designed various institutional 
arrangements in order to diminish the number of application actually presented to the 
CDAPH. This reduction of the role of the CDAPH was not, from the point of view of the 
MDPH, a problem in terms of decision-making since decisions are actually prepared, before 
the CDAPH, by multi-disciplinary technical teams (Perrier 2012). A certain number of these 
decisions then happen to be validated without being discussed by the CDAPH. Procedures 
designed to limit the number of files discussed by the CDAPH include the creation of “sub-
committees” (commissions restreintes) which include a limited number of committee 
members, and more importantly, a system of “list-decision” (décision sur liste), also labeled 
“blocked list” in some departments, according to which a certain number of decisions by the 
technical teams are validated without being discussed by the CDAPH; in this case, the 
CDAPH’s decision-making role is materialized by the simple presence,  when the committee 
meets, of one or a few paper copies of a long list of individual decisions (cf table 1).  
“Simple examination” and “in-depth examination” of individual applications by a local 
committee (CDAPH) 
 
In one of the departments studied, the CDAPH takes place twice a month over the course of a 
half-day (9h30-12h30). Unlike other departments, this department does not distinguish 
between “adults” and “children” CDAPH, a distinction that was inherited from the previous 
                                                 
17
 Décret n° 2005-1589 du 19 décembre 2005 
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institutional system that was in place in France at the level of departments (CDES for 
children, COTOREP for adults) from 1975 to 2005. The MDPH teams select a few number 
of files that they wish the CDAPH to discuss based on specific themes that they want to 
tackle (for example, schooling, or the issue of young adults being stuck in children’s 
institutions because of the lack of available positions in adult structures). During a CDAPH 
meeting I observed in June, 2012, 6 applications were discussed during the session. The rest 
of the decisions made by the technical teams on all of the other applications is validated by 
the presence, on the table, of a few paper copies of a listing taking the form of a table 
including the following items: 
 
File number Name  Date of 
birth 
Contact 
info  
Impairment 
level (%) 
Claim  Technical 
team 
proposal 
Rights 
entitlement 
begins 
(date) 
Rights 
entitlement 
ends (date) 
         
         
 
Another (one-page) table being circulated during the meeting , entitled “meeting agenda”, 
mentions the total number of decisions validated by the holding of the meeting (604) 
 
 Children  Adults  
In-depth examination 3 3 
Simple examination 183 
(215 applications) 
415 
(1230 applications) 
Total  186 418 
604 files 
 
The 604 files, here labeled as being subject to a “simple exam”, were not mentioned during 
the discussions. The meeting started with a general discussion of a local disability services 
issue, which lasted for over an hour, and then 6 individual applications were orally presented, 
and the discussion around these lasted an hour and thirty minutes. 
 
What do civil society organizations think of such devices, which concretely result in 
bypassing their decision-making power? While protest would be expected in such 
circumstances, associations generally accept the principle of a need for such devices. The 
explanation of their acceptance is twofold. First, most of them are not ready to spend more 
time for the committee: voluntary organization leaders complain a lot about the time-
consuming character of all their “representation” tasks (being on various committees at 
several levels of government, and the CDAPH is only one of them). In the one out of the four 
departments we studied where the CDAPH lasted for the longest time (the committee sat from 
9 AM to 6 PM), association representatives complained about how exhausted they were at the 
end of the day: 
I am there all day long. Passed about 4 PM… [He sighs, miming exhaustion]. Because you 
know, we only have 45 minutes for lunch.  
One of the aspects of working inside the institution is the incorporation of institutional 
constraints – time constraints in the present case. Association members generally are not 
willing to spend more time in committee meetings, so increasing committee hours in order to 
discuss more applications is not an option. Secondly, and in this context in which increasing 
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committee hours is not an option, association members worry that putting a larger number of 
files into the discussion process will result in increasing already excessive file-processing 
delays at the detriment of users in need of quick decisions. Here again, disability rights 
advocacy faces contradictions in the context of local implementation, when users’ right to an 
administrative decision within a reasonable time is perceived by rights advocates as going 
against their right to a decision involving representatives of the disability rights movement.  
Hence associations generally accept the principle of a need for such devices that reduce their 
actual participation in the decision-making process. Yet they need to make sense of their 
participation in the committee as disability rights advocates. As a consequence, they are 
inclined to redefine their role in the committee, from an actual decision-making role to a role 
of scrutiny and control of MDPH decisions. Derisory though it may seem, the hundred-pages 
listing set on the table for CDAPH members to look at symbolizes this “watchdog” role 
assumed by association members. In the department whose CDAPH was described in the 
frame above, one of our interviewees mentions this stack of paper, alluding to the possibility 
of checking, even though it seems hard to do in practice: 
The thing is, when the CDAPH meets, we only see the applications that raised some 
issues within the technical team. It means that there are about 600 files each week that 
we don’t see. We see between 6 and 8 applications during each session. What I’m saying 
is, out of the 600 that are processed without us because the technical team didn’t have 
any issue with them, that’s where (then, I don’t know how we could do that), but that, 
maybe, is where we should have… How could I put it? You know, there is this  stack 
laying there, each Thursday morning, when we go there, a stack with 600 applications, 
adults and children altogether, and we should, I don’t know, we should arrive there at 5 
in the morning [laughs] to see. Because in fact, they only write down “yes” or “no”, if an 
adult disability benefit is allocated, yes or no. If a benefit was not granted, we don’t 
know why. What we should do is say, for example, at the beginning of each CDAPH: “ok, 
let’s randomly…” 
Q: Yes, “this file, let’s check” 
A: Yes, that’s it. 
Q: Do you have the right to ask to look at a given file? 
A: Yes, to ask that it be examined [by the CDAPH]. Well, then… We figure, we trust the 
technical team. I mean, they are professionals. They are people like you and me, we’ll 
say, doing their job.  
The idea, in this perspective, is to avoid that the committee become a mere “rubber-stamping” 
assembly, according to an expression which often comes up in the interviews (here, in another 
department): 
 [Referring to a recent MDPH proposal to increase the number of files that would be 
processed through the “blocked list” system] What I’m saying is, we shouldn’t let things 
like that happen; otherwise what’s the use of us going to the CDAPH? They are taking 
away all the point of civil society organizations being in this committee. If we don’t see 
the decisions anymore – even for children – I’m missing something here. If everything 
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goes directly through, what’s the point of us being there? Then we’re a mere rubber-
stamp. Period. 
In order to avoid this situation in which the commission becomes a mere “rubber-stamp”, 
associations generally try to keep control, or at least show they have some influence, over the 
definition of the criteria used to enable an application to be processed through the “blocked 
list” procedure. 
However, this mobilization is not always free from ambiguities, in so far as it does not 
question the general assumption according to which the number of applications presented in 
front of the CDAPH must be reduced. This leads to surprising scenes, such as one I witnessed 
in one of the departments where CDAPH members were holding a meeting in order to define 
new procedures for the committee. At the beginning of this session, a representative of the 
MDPH introduces the criteria that were adopted at the previous meeting, defining applications 
that had to be examined by the CDAPH. While projecting a slide with the list on a screen, the 
MDPH representative orally notes that it was decided during the previous session that the 
number of applications being discussed would be limited to “8 to 15 files per session”, and 
that given the fact that the CDAPH meets half a day per week, “we will not be able to 
examine all the files that match these criteria. We trust the [technical] team to select the 15 
files”. One of the association representatives, who had missed the first session, asks questions 
about several of the criteria, and insists on adding two new criteria (Refusal of recognition as 
a disabled worker (RQTH) and training refusal) to the list following which the MDPH 
representative directly modifies the slide to add the new criteria. However, association 
representatives don’t make any comments regarding the statement according to which the 
number of applications being discussed would be limited to “8 to 15 files per session” 18. 
While the introduction of such a limit would seem to make the whole mobilization around the 
precise definition of the criteria irrelevant, this mobilization makes sense for the organizations 
as a way to assert their role as watchdogs
19
. 
Further, mobilizing against planned reforms of CDAPH functioning also helps create social 
movement unity, against the previously described tendency to segmentation. The following 
excerpt is particularly significant in this perspective: in another department, I ask the 
president of an organization about whether he perceived a clear split, within the CDAPH, 
                                                 
18
 To be sure, since this was the second day of a meeting devoted to the reform of CDAPH functioning, this may 
have been a point of discussion during the previous session. However, nobody contradicts or expresses 
dissatisfaction facing the statement, when other criticisms are expressed (regarding the definition of the criteria). 
This tends to validate the idea of a consensus regarding the limitation of the number of files being discussed,  
19
 The possibility of an effect of my presence cannot be completely neglected either. The presence of an outside 
observer, especially since I had mentioned being in charge of the disability rights organization section of the 
collective project, may have influenced to some extent the behavior of association members. A scene observed 
during another CDAPH discussion on individual applications, involving the same CDAPH members, suggested 
that the role played by this association representative may have been to some extent influenced by my presence: 
in a discussion on allocation of school aid to a child, this same association representative stressed the fact that 
the number of hours of aid allotted per week should be specified on the notification,  otherwise “It doesn’t really 
create entitlement. If we don’t specify a minimum amount of time, the school may say “no more than two 
hours””. Then he looked at me and said “The associative is speaking here”. The observer’s paradox however 
here reveals what association representatives conceive as the role they should be playing (defending a child’s 
right to proper school aid), and is significant if analyzed as such. 
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between association representatives and other representatives. While asking this question, I 
had in mind possible diverging opinions on individual applications, whereas he immediately 
answered mentioning the current mobilization around a planned reform of CDAPH 
functioning as a factor of movement unity: 
Q: Regarding the positioning of the different members within the CDAPH, are there 
recurring dividing lines that appear? For example, are associations always on the same 
position as opposed to…? 
R: We have a consistence among associations and we try to remain this way. Notably, I 
know that I… Here, we’ve been working on […] blocked lists. Block lists are against the 
law since, theoretically, applications are not supposed to be processed through blocked 
lists. Alright. But then we must recognize that we don’t have the choice because 
otherwise we would have to sit at the committee every day; since about 60% of the 
applications are processed through the blocked list system. [But now] they want to be 
able to process more applications through [this system], notably in the children’s 
department, they wanted to have everything go through blocked list except when 
parents appeal and when the technical team had specific issues with a file. […] We, the 
associations, we said “No, no way”. We did not agree. So regarding this, I immediately 
phoned all the associations that sit at the CDAPH, by means of [a local cross-disability 
coordination of associations], so we could have a meeting and define a position.  
Here, the immediate evocation of the mobilizations around the CDAPH’s functioning reveals 
the importance of this issue for disability rights organizations. While adjusting to institutional 
constraints through their acceptance of the need to limit the number of files being discussed, 
association representatives still want to preserve a distinct advocacy stance within the 
Committee, by means of the establishment of a form of a right of oversight over MDPH 
decisions. Collective mobilization around the preservation of this right of oversight helps 
create a form of social movement unity, which otherwise is not obvious in the process of 
discussing the individual applications. 
 
Conclusion 
The courses of action taken by disability rights organization members and professionals 
within and around the “rights and autonomy committee” reveal and help specify some of the 
tensions inherent to social movements endorsing an institutional role.  
The study of pre-application counseling practices reveals a clear partition between volunteers 
and professionals (the latter systematically helping applicants, following a management logic, 
and the former often expressing reluctance to institutionalize this role as a volunteer role 
within their organizations), as well as intra-movement differences regarding voluntary 
involvement in counseling. Being on the allocation committees, association leaders come to 
interiorize some of the institutional constraints, such as the idea of a limited available time 
and the need to reduce delays in file processing. The need to do with institutional constraints 
does not, however, lead to association members taking on a purely institutional role, but 
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favors a reframing of advocacy, in terms of oversight rather than participation in decision-
making.  
Moreover, intra-movement differences appear at all stages of disability organizations’ 
involvement; more contentious stances have been noticed on the part of organization 
members who themselves are disabled (which, in France, corresponds for the most part to 
mobility-impairment organizations as well as hearing-impairment and visual impairment 
organizations). This, however, is not systematic, which suggests that the way association 
members define their role in CDAPH is a complex result of their social background, political 
socialization, the guidelines provided by the disability organization they are part of, as well as 
the interactions which take place among committee members. 
Finally, the study of this particular form of advocacy at the local level illustrates the influence 
of the movement’s embeddedness in a local setting on the definition of advocacy: information 
such as knowing who the right doctors are, or knowing how long the waiting list is for a given 
service or facility, undeniably influence the forms taken by this discreet type of advocacy 
through participation in the allocation of rights. 
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